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I. INTRODUCTION
Surrogacy refers to the process through which a woman intentionally
becomes pregnant with a baby that she does not intend to keep.' Rather,
she is carrying the baby for its intended parent or parents, usually because
the parent is unable to do so without her.2 In traditional surrogacy, the
surrogate contributes her own egg, which is artificially inseminated with the
donor's sperm.3 In gestational surrogacy, a fertilized egg is implanted in
the surrogate. Because the overwhelming majority of surrogates no longer
use their own eggs, in this Article, "surrogacy" will refer to gestational
surrogacy. Surrogacy may be altruistic, in which the surrogate is not paid
for her labor,6 or commercial, in which she is.7  Surrogacy may also use
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I. In the Matter of Baby M, 537 N.J. 396, 410 (1988).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. JANET L. DOLGIN & Lois L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 69 (2nd ed. 2009).
5. J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stem, The Children ofBaby M, 39 CAP. U. L. REv. 345,355
(2011) (noting that in 2011, "95% of surrogates carry embryos created by genetic materials other than
their own."); Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination ofLegal Parentage, 113 HARv. L. REv. 835, 912 (2000) (noting that "there is no sexual
analog to this particular form of technological conception.").
6. An altruistic surrogate may be the sister of an intended parent who would otherwise be
unable to have a biologically related child, for example. See, e.g., DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 4,
at 172.
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donor sperm, in which case the intended parents have no biological
relationship to the baby or babies.8 There may be multiple surrogates,
fathers, mothers, donors, and babies. It can get very complicated.
Surrogacy exposes parenthood, not as a biological fact, but as a legally and
socially constructed status with responsibilities and obligations as well as
benefits.
As set out in a recent report by the Permanent Bureau at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, commercial surrogacy has been
banned in many nation states.9 In a minority of states, it is allowed and
regulated, and in some states, it is completely unregulated. As the Hague
Report notes, this has produced a booming business in transnational
surrogacy.10 In India alone, reproductive tourism is a $400 to $500 million
per year business." In addition to the monetary costs, there are human
costs. Transnational surrogacy results in complex, and often conflicting,
rules regarding basic family law issues of maternity, paternity, custody,
visitation, and children's rights.12
A similarly unsettled situation exists among the states in the United
States (U.S.). While the U.S. Constitution requires states to give full faith
and credit to the judgments of sister states, there has always been a public
7. Medical expenses are generally covered in commercial surrogacy. MAGDALINA
GUGUCHEVA, SURROGACY IN AMERICA 3 (Council for Responsible Genetics 2010), available at
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/KAEVEJOAl M.pdf (last visited Mar. 13,
2012) (describing commercial surrogacy arrangements); Melanie Thernstrom, My Futuristic Insta-
Family, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, at 34, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/magazine/
02babymaking-t.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) (describing financial arrangements in
a commercial surrogacy arrangement). While it seems likely that they are also covered in altruistic
surrogacy; only anecdotal evidence is available.
8. For a detailed account of some of the major procedures available, see Lisa C. Ikemoto,
Reproductive Tourism: Equality Concerns in the Global Market for Fertility Services, 27 LAw & INEQ.
277, 283 (2009).
9. Surrogacy has been banned in much of Europe, for example, usually on the ground that it
commodifies women. See Arlie Hochschild, Childbirth at the Global Crossroads, 20 AMERICAN
PROSPECT, Sept. 19, 2009, at 25, 27 (stating that surrogacy is banned in China, New York and much of
Europe), available at http://prospect.orglarticle/childbirth-global-crossroads-0 (last visited Mar. 13,
2012); Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Private International Law Issues Surrounding the Status
of Children, Including Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements, at 3, Prel. Doc. No.
11 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff20l1pd11e.pdf (last visited Mar.
13, 2012) [hereinafter Hague Conf. on Private Int'l Law].
10. Hague Conf. on Private Int'l Law, supra note 9, at 6. Transnational surrogacy, as used in
this Article, refers to surrogacy arrangements in which one or more of the parties are nationals of
different nation states.
11. Id.; Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 225 (2009).
12. Hague Conf. on Private Int'l Law, supra note 9, at 3-4.
policy exception in family law.'3  That is, states have refused to give full
faith and credit to judgments of sister states that offended their own public
policy, such as marriage between first cousins. The federal Defense of
Marriage Act, along with the similar acts passed in many states, extend this
to recognition of same-sex marriagesl4
Like international surrogacy, surrogacy in America encompasses a
broad range of approaches, from supportive states, such as California,s to
states in which all surrogacy contracts are barred and criminal sanctions
may be imposed, as in Michigan.' 6 Unlike surrogates in much of the rest of
the world, surrogates in the United States are unlikely to be trafficked,
enslaved, or held to onerous contracts. 7  Indeed, surrogacy in America
seems to be increasingly open.'8 Transnational surrogacy, in contrast,
seems to be increasingly corporate, drawing on a wide range of domestic
laws, including some notably lax domestic laws and dramatically disparate
economic circumstances, to create new families. 9
Part I of this Article introduces the subject and explains why the
domestic family laws of the participating states are inadequate to address it.
Part II explains how international human rights law provides some useful
guidelines, especially three major human rights treaties:2 0
1) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights;21
2) The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); 22 and
13. IRA M. ELLMAN & PAUL M. KURTZ, FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 175 (5th ed.
2010).
14. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
15. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7606 (2012).
16. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.857 (1988).
17. This is not to suggest that such practices are unknown in this country. They are not,
however, appealing to middle class Americans seeking surrogates. See, e.g., Melanie Thernstrom, supra
note 7, at 28.
18. Id.
19. For an insightful exploration, see Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility
Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 327 (2005).
20. For some of the reasons for this refusal, see Catherine Powell, Lifting our Veil of
Ignorance: Culture, Constitutionalism, and Women 's Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 331, 375 (2005); Barbara Stark, At Last? Ratification of the Economic Covenant as a
Congressional-Executive Agreement, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 108 (2011).
21. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at49 (Jan. 3,
1976), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2012)
[hereinafter International Covenant].
22. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res
34/180, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 193 (Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter
CEDAW].
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3) The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 23
While none of these treaties explicitly address surrogacy, they each
address rights crucial in this context, including the right to health,24 the
right to support,25 the right to know one's origins,26 and the right to a
family.27  The argument here is that, at the very least, where surrogacy is
allowed, the protections of well-established human rights norms should be
assured. In some cases, this may be accomplished through regulationS28 or
contractual provisions, such as the assurance for the gestational mother of
free pre-natal care. In other cases, this may be more difficult, such as
treatment for as yet unknown conditions that may result from the hormonal
treatments necessary for surrogacy. If, for any reason, such assurances are
impossible, surrogacy should be barred as a violation of human rights.
Because there is no human "right to a child," 29 even those who can
only have a genetically-related child with the help of a surrogate, including
single gay men and gay couples, have no basis for a claim. Once a child
has been born, however-assuming the child is not the result of a coerced
pregnancy or a similarly egregious violation of human rights-a growing
international jurisprudence supports the right of that child's gay father, or
fathers, to raise her.30
The usefulness of private international law to resolve disputes arising
out of surrogacy is similarly problematic. Fundamental considerations of
judicial comity, in which the courts of one state defer to the judgment of
23. See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 61st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1980) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC].
24. International Covenant, supra note 21, art. 12.
25. Id. art. 10.
26. CRC, supra note 23, art. 7.
27. Id.
28. Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics ofCommodification, 72 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 109, 146 (2009) (noting that, "well-designed regulation can greatly mitigate most of the
potential tangible harms of surrogacy.").
29. Those instruments that contemplate parenthood focus instead on limiting state
interference with reproductive rights. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 11.2 (measures to be taken
by states to "prevent discrimination . . . on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure
[women's] effective right to work." ); id. art. 11(2) (requiring the state to "ensure access to healthcare
services, including those related to family planning" and, more specifically, to "ensure to women
appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free
services when necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation."); id. art. 12
(reiterating the right to family planning services for rural women in particular.). But see Part H.A.
Reproductive Rights (suggesting support for an argument against state interference with intending
parents' efforts to "achieve their reproductive goals.").
30. Barbara Stark, The Women's Convention, Reproductive Rights, and the Reproduction of
Gender, 18 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 261, 274-78 (2011).
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another, are trumped by public policy in this context.' Thus,
notwithstanding the virtually universal concern for the children produced
through surrogacy, some states prohibiting surrogacy refuse to grant such
children citizenship, because they fear that doing so would only encourage
the prohibited practice.32 As the Permanent Bureau notes, this plainly calls
for further study. While the range of applicable laws regarding surrogacy
complicates-and may even preclude-harmonization, it should be noted
that the legality of surrogacy does not necessarily correspond to its
prevalence in a particular state. Roughly 5% of gestational surrogacy in
vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures in the United States take place in New
York, for example, where surrogacy contracts are void.34
II. WHY SURROGACY IS DIFFERENT
Pre-existing family law is inadequate to address surrogacy, in part
because of the multiple parents, and in part because of the breakdown in
traditional parenting functions. State laws governing parentage, for
example, generally provide that a woman giving birth is the child's legal
mother. 6 The birth mother does not lose her status as legal mother until
and unless she voluntarily surrenders the baby. As a matter of law, a child
cannot be surrendered for adoption before birth. The premise is that a
mother cannot be certain that she wants to surrender the baby until he or she
31. Hague Conf. on Private Int'l Law, supra note 9, at 10.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 22.
34. GUGUCHEVA, supra note 7, at 15.
35. Id. at 26 (noting that, commercial surrogates are generally paid from $12,000 to $25,000
for their services. This averages out to roughly $.50 per hour). Fertility Law, AM. BAR ASSOC.,
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gpsolo-magazine-home/gp solo-magazine index
/erickson.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (The payment is for the surrogate's services; if it were for the
baby it would amount to baby-selling, which is illegal everywhere.).
36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(c)(2)(2 0 0 8 ) (West 2011) (stating that the surrogate mother is
presumed to be the natural mother of the child and this information is listed on the birth certificate);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 11-38-1113 (West 2011) (stating that the mother of the child is the one who gives
birth to the child).
37. Or is determined by an appropriate court to be so unfit, and so incapable of becoming fit
that her parental rights are legally terminated. See, e.g., Santosky II v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1390
(1982) ("[T]he State may terminate, over parental objection, the rights of parents in their natural child
upon a finding that the child is permanently neglected.").
38. Hague Conf. on Private Int'l Law, Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, Convention 29, art. 4 (May 1993), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt33en.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2012). See also MONT. CODE
ANN. § 42-2-408 (West 2011) (stating that the relinquishment and the consent to adoption of a child can
only occur 72 hours after the child has been born); NEB. REv. STAT. § 127.070 (West 2010) (stating that
release and consent for adoption that occur before the birth of a child are invalid).
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arrives.39  For this reason, several states have decided that traditional
surrogacy contracts are unenforceable.4 0 Rather, the surrogate cannot be
required to surrender a baby on the ground that she agreed to do so before it
was born.
These laws assume that the woman giving birth is also the baby's
biological mother-that is, that the baby developed from her egg.4' When
the baby is not the biological offspring of the surrogate, but rather
biologically related to a separate egg donor, the law-and the arguments-
change.4 2 Legislators have often left these sensitive issues to the courts.
There has been considerable commentary since the Baby A1 3 case
almost twenty-five years ago." Those who have addressed surrogacy have
generally focused on the most vulnerable, starting with the infant.45 While
at least one commentator46 rejects the "best interest of the child test" itself
as inapplicable in this context, most raise more concrete, specific questions.
Who is legally responsible? What if the intending parents split up? What if
39. Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v. Commonwealth of KY ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209,
213 (1986) ("The policy ... is to preserve to the mother her right of choice regardless of decisions made
before the birth of the child.").
40. D.C. CODE § 16-402 (West 2011) ("Surrogate parenting contracts are prohibited and
rendered unenforceable."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 2011) ("A surrogate parentage
contract is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21.200 (West
2011) ("A surrogate parenthood contract entered into shall be void and unenforceable."); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 14-18-05 (West 2011) ("Any agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate .
through assisted conception is void.").
41. Adoptive Parents of M.L.V. & A.L.V. v. Wilkens, 598 N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (1992) (stating
that "[b]ecause it is generally not difficult to determine the biological mother of a child, a mother's legal
obligations to her child arise when she gives birth."); A.L.A. v. E.A.G, No. A10-443, 2011 N.W.2d WL
4181449, at *2 (D. Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2011) ("The parent and child relationship between a child
and the child's biological mother 'may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child."').
42. Cf MARY L. SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MATTERS MOST IN
AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME SEX AND UNWED
PARENTS 111 (2001) (assuming traditional surrogacy); DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS, How
MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 85 (2006).
43. In the Matter of Baby M, supra note 1.
44. DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 5, at 347 (noting "the revolution in reproductive
demographics that had occurred since Baby M.").
45. Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved
Theory of Commodification, in THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS READER, LAW MEDICINE, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF MOTHERHOOD 299, 302 (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008) (Ertman identifies four
negative implications of the alternative insemination (Al) market: eugenics, lack of access for poor
women, depriving children of relationship or support from biological father, and treating children like
chattel. She defends Al, arguing that these concerns "are not unique to the Al market, or because
addressing the concern would itself trigger other negative effects."); I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating
Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423, 437-42 (2011) (explaining the
problem with the best interest test in this context).
46. Cohen, supra note 45, at 437.
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they change their minds or die? What if the baby is premature or has health
problems? What if the baby has health problems resulting from the
surrogate's drug use or alcohol intake during pregnancy? How will the
child deal with her unusual origins?
Commentators are also concerned about protecting presumably poorer,
less educated surrogates from exploitation. Dorothy Roberts has pointed
out the risks, especially high once gestational surrogacy allows a black
surrogate to carry a white egg, of exploiting women of color.47 In Johnson
v. Calvert, the California court held that the black gestational surrogate had
no right to the white baby she carried.48 What about the surrogate mother's
reproductive rights? Like Mary Beth Whitehead in Baby M, she might not
appreciate how attached she is to the baby until it is born. On the other
hand, what if the surrogate changes her mind before birth and decides to
have an abortion?
Commentators have further noted that surrogates incur even greater
risks and burdens than those usually associated with pregnancy and
childbirth.4 9  A gestational surrogate must have her menstrual cycles
precisely matched to that of the egg donor, so that her womb is receptive to
the fertilized egg just when it is ready to be implanted.50  This requires
surrogates to ingest large doses of hormones, the long-term effects of which
are unknown.5'
47. Dorothy Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, in THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
READER, LAW MEDICINE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MOTHERHOOD 308 (Nancy Ehrenreich, ed.,
2008) (while noting that surrogacy is not the same as slavery's "dehumanization," makes a powerful
case that "it is the enslavement of Blacks that enables us to imagine the commodification of human
beings, and that makes the vision of fingible breeder women so real.").
48. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
49. GUGUCHEVA, supra note 7, at 21.
50. Amrita Pande, Not an 'Angel,' not a 'Whore': Surrogates as 'Dirty' Workers in India, 16
INDIA J. GEND. STUD. 141, 147 (2009). As Pande explains:
Gestational surrogacy is a much more complex medical process than traditional
surrogacy, since the surrogate is not genetically related to the baby and her body
has to be 'prepared' for artificial pregnancy. The transfer of the embryo itself is
not very difficult by the process of getting the surrogate ready for that transfer and
the weeks after that require heavy medical intervention. First, birth-control pills
and shots of hormones are required to control and suppress the surrogate's own
ovulatory cycle and then injections of estrogen are given to build her uterine
lining. After the transfer, daily injections of progesterone are administered until
her body understands that it is pregnant and can sustain the pregnancy on its own.
The side effects of these medications can include hot flashes, mood swings,
headaches, bloating, vaginal spotting, uterine cramping, breast fullness, light
headedness and vaginal irritation.
Id.; DiFonzo & Stem, supra note 5, at 363-64 (noting risks of "hormonally stimulated egg
production.").
51. GUGUCHEVA, supra note 7, at 21; Pande, supra note 50, at 147.
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Early empirical studies provide little support for some of these
arguments, at least in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
This research suggests that surrogates are not necessarily poor.5 2 Nor are
they pressured into surrogacys3 or unable to separate from the babies that
they have carried.5 4  The surrogates in these studies are white, married,
Christian," and not especially poor. They do not feel exploited. They are
glad to have the $20,000 to $25,000 average fee, but they are surrogates
for other reasons. Many report that they enjoy being pregnant. They are
proud of their accomplishment, and glad that they could make such a
difference in the lives of otherwise childless couples. 7 Finally, the expense
of surrogacy is also a concern. As Professor Roberts asks, "[b]ut can we
justify devoting such exorbitant sums to a risky, non-therapeutic procedure
52. Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid's Tale: Feminist Theory Meets
Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 44 (2009) ("Importantly, no
empirical study reviewed for this paper indicates that any surrogate mothers become involved with
surrogacy because they were experiencing financial distress.").
53. Id. at 50 ("One consistent finding in the empirical research is that the idea of becoming a
surrogate mother started with the women themselves; there was no evidence in any study indicating that
women were being pressured or coerced into becoming surrogate mothers.").
54. Id. at 68.
The empirical research does not support the concerns about pre-natal maternal
bonding or emotional instability during pregnancy. Van den Akker's 2007 study
of 61 British surrogate mothers reported that anxiety was not high during the
pregnancy among surrogate mothers and detachment is reported early and
maintained throughout the pregnancy, with little post-variation post-delivery.
Id. at 48.
This may be due, in part, to agency preferences for women who are already
mothers. Clinics and agencies report that they will only agree to work with
women who have given birth because this status increases the chances of a
successful pregnancy and delivery and means that the women have a more
realistic perception of what it would mean for them to surrender a child.
Id. at 48.
55. Busby & Vun, supra note 52, at 42 ("[S]tudies on surrogate mothers consistently show
that most women who agree to become either gratuitous or commercial surrogates are Caucasian,
Christian, and in their late 20-early 30s.").
56. DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 5, at 357. See also GUGUCHEVA, supra note 7, at 26.
57. Busby & Vun, supra 52, at 71.
Other longitudinal studies also showed that positive attitudes remained stable over
time. Teman concluded, following a review of the research, that "almost all of
the studies . .. find, in the end, that the overwhelming majority of surrogates do
not regret their decision and they even express feelings of pride and
accomplishment.
Id.
2012]
with an 80 percent failure rate when so many basic health needs go
unmet?"58
As Professor Garrison notes, surrogacy can easily be banned since, in
contrast to "ordinary surrogacy, gestational surrogacy invariably involves
IVF, which requires the participation of licensed medical personnel who
will rarely be willing to risk their licenses by performing illegal
procedures."
III. SURROGACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Reproductive Rights
Reproductive rights are relatively new in international law. The basic
concept first appeared in the final document approved by the Teheran
Conference on Human Rights in 1968, which recognized the "rights to
decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of children and to
have the access to the information, education and means to enable them to
exercise these rights."o It was not until the World Conference on
Population in 1994 (Cairo Conference) that reproductive rights were clearly
articulated. 6 1 Although convened to address population issues, the
participants in the Cairo Conference recognized that:
1) Family-planning programs should not involve any form of
coercion;
2) Govemmentally-sponsored economic incentives and
disincentives were only marginally effective; and
58. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 47, at 317.
59. Garrison, supra note 5, at 916.
60. Proc. of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 32/41, at 3 (1968), available at http:l 1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/12ptichr.htm (last visited
Mar. 13, 2012). See Reed Boland, The Environment, Population, and Women's Human Rights, 27
ENVTL. L. 1137, 1158 (1997). Reproductive rights encompass a wide range of activities. These include
surrogacy, other forms of assisted conception, female genital surgeries, and the health needs of women
with HIV/AIDS. For a comprehensive overview, see REBECCA J. COOK, BERNARD M. DICKENS, &
MAHMOUD E. FATHALLA, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS, INTEGRATING MEDICINE,
ETHICS, AND LAW, at v (2003). See generally Malcolm L. Goggin, Deborah A. Orth, Ivar Bleiklie, &
Christine Rothmayr, The Comparative Policy Design Perspective, in COMPARATIVE BIOMEDICAL
POLICY I (Ivar Bleiklie, Malcolm L. Goggin, & Christine Rothmayr eds., 2004); Protocol to the African
charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, July 11, 2003 African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 66, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/
Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol%20on%20the%2ORights%20of%2OWomen.pdf (last visited Mar.
13, 2012). See CEDAW, supra note 22, arts. 4, 6 (CEDAW does not necessarily include a right to
assisted conception, nor does CEDAW necessarily bar surrogacy-on the basis that it perpetuates
gender stereotypes, for example).
61. U.N. Population Information Network, Report of the ICPD, 1 1.12, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.171/13 (Oct. 18, 1994), available at http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/poa.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Rep. of the ICPD].
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3) Governmental goals "should be defined in terms of unmet
needs for information and services," rather than quotas or
62
targets imposed on service providers.
"The aim should be to assist couples and individuals to achieve their
reproductive goals and give them the full opportunity to exercise the right
to have children by choice."63  The Cairo Conference recognized that
reproductive rights include both "the basic right of all couples and
individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing
of their children and to have the information and means to do so and the
right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health.""
This broad formulation reflects the participating states' disparate
approaches to reproductive rights as well as the failure of many states to
address these rights at all.65
Reproductive rights are increasingly recognized in international human
rights law.66 These rights, including education about family planning and
access to contraception, are now widely recognized throughout the world,
often in connection with the right to health. Almost every state allows
access to contraception, and several states provide contraceptives as a free
public health benefit.67
Surrogacy was not on the agenda at Cairo; it was neither supported nor
condemned. To the extent surrogacy enables those otherwise unable to
"achieve their reproductive goals and . . . have children by choice,"6 Cairo
arguably supports surrogacy. At the very least, it would weigh against an
outright government ban of the practice.6 9
62. Id.17.12.
63. Id. 17.16 (A number of countries entered reservations, specifically objecting to the word
"individuals" in 7.16).
64. Id. 7.3. These goals were reiterated at the United Nations, Fourth World Conference on
Women. As set out in the Beijing Platform, the human rights of women include their right to have
control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and
reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Report of the Fourth World
Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4, 1995, 96, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.177/20/Rev.1 (1996),
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdflBeijing%20full%20report%/ 2OE.pdf (last
visited Mar. 13, 2012).
65. D. MARIANNE BLAIR ET AL., FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 819-20 (2009)
(describing the absence of reproductive rights in Lebanon).
66. RUTH DIXON-MUELLER, POPULATION POLICY & WOMEN'S RIGHTS, TRANSFORMING
REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 128 (1993) (describing customs in the Sahel); Abd-el Kader Boye et al.,
Population Council, Marriage Law and Practice in the Sahel, in STUDIES IN FAMILY PLANNING 347
(John Bongaarts & Gary Bologh, eds., 1991).
67. See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 65, at 794.
68. Rep. of the ICPD, supra note 61, at 17.16.
69. For a rigorous analysis of the concerns about commodification in this contest, see
MARGARET J. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 140 (1996) (Radin's analysis assumes traditional
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The counterweight, of course, would be the impact on the gestational
surrogate and the resulting baby. CEDAW assures the rights of pregnant
women. 70 Article 11.2, for example, sets out the measures to be taken by
states to "prevent discrimination . . . on the grounds of marriage or
maternity and to ensure [women's] effective right to work."71 These
measures include the prohibition of dismissal for pregnancy or maternity
leave,72 maternity leave with pay or "comparable social benefits," and the
"necessary supporting social services to enable parents to combine family
obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in
particular through the establishment ... of childcare facilities." 4 Article 12
requires the state to "ensure access to healthcare services, including those
related to family planning" and, more specifically, to "ensure to women
appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement in the post-
natal period, granting free services when necessary, as well as adequate
nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.,7 5  Article 14 reiterates the right
to family planning services for rural women in particular.76 Finally, Article
16 requires states to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations." In addition to these specific guarantees, Article 5 more broadly
surrogacy. She notes that cases in which both would-be-parents contribute their genetic material [may]
become more prevalent in the future.).
70. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 1.
71. Id. art. 11.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 11.
75. General Comment by Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women art. 12, Sept. 3, 1981, U.N. A/54/38/Rev.1, ch. I, available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#articlel2 (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
The Committee's General Recommendation No. 24 elaborates on Article 12.1, addressing women's
access to health care, including family planning services. The Committee recommends that "[w]hen
possible, legislation criminalizing abortion could be amended to remove punitive provisions imposed on
women who undergo abortion." Id. at 12(2). For a more detailed formulation of these rights, see CTR.
FOR REPRODUCTIVE RTS., THE PROTOCOL ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA: AN INSTRUMENT
FOR ADVANCING REPRODUCTIVE AND SEXUAL RIGHTS 1 (2003), available at
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pubbpafrica.pdf (last visited
Mar. 13, 2012).
76. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 14.
77. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 16 (Article 16 has received an unprecedented number of
reservations); Luisa Blanchfield, The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women: Issues in the U.S. Ratification Debate, Cong. Res. Serv. 7-5700, at 2
(2010) (two States Parties to the Convention-Malta and Monaco-stated in their reservations to
CEDAW that they do not interpret Article 16(l)(e) as imposing or forcing the legalization of abortion in
their respective countries); Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination ofAll
Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L 643, 702 (1990).
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demands recognition of maternity as "a social function," rather than a
commercial function.78
To the extent CEDAW focuses on the health of the pregnant woman, it
is not inconsistent with gestational surrogacy.79  Rather, it confirms
safeguards that, by protecting the health of the surrogate, reduce objections
to the practice. To the extent CEDAW focuses on maternity as a "social
function," however, it is difficult to reconcile with commercial surrogacy,
or at least those forms of commercial surrogacy in which the intending
parents and the surrogate remain strangers.80
B. A "Right to Parent"for Gay Men?
For gay men who want to parent a genetically-related child, surrogacy
may be their only hope.8 Just as surrogacy was not on the agenda at Cairo,
neither was parenting by same-sex couples or gay or lesbian individuals.
But LGBT&Q-Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and Queer or
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and Questioning-rights have
achieved widespread recognition since 1994. Since reproductive rights,
including the right to parent, are human rights, like other human rights, they
should be universally assured.
As Justice Albie Sachs explained in Minister of Home Affairs v.
Fourie, extending the benefits of marriage to same-sex partners is
fundamentally a matter of equality:
[O]ur Constitution represents a radical rupture with a past based
on intolerance and exclusion, and the movement forward to the
acceptance of the need to develop a society based on equality and
respect by all for all. [. . .] A democratic, universalistic, caring
and aspirationally egalitarian society embraces everyone and
accepts people for who they are. [. .] The acknowledgement
and acceptance of difference is particularly important in our
country where for centuries group membership based on
supposed biological characteristics such as skin colour has been
the express basis of advantage and disadvantage. . . . [A]t issue
78. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 5.
79. See, e.g., Amelia Gentleman, India Nurtures Business of Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at A9; See generally Scott, supra note 28.
80. CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 5.
8 1. Anne R. Dana, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal parentage for Gay
Fathers, 18 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 353, 363 (2011).
82. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) (stating
that,"[w]hereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.").
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is a need to affirm the very character of our society as one based
on tolerance and mutual respect.83
Like racial discrimination, discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is grounded in intolerance and exclusion. In validating same-
sex marriage, courts and legislatures throughout the world have rejected the
notion of a "natural" sexual division of labor requiring marriage to be
restricted to a union between a man and a woman. Rather, there is growing
recognition that a state committed to democratic values, especially the
equality of its citizens, can no longer endorse laws that discriminate against
some of those citizens.
The European Union, with its twenty-seven member states, has been a
leader in recognizing the equal rights of same-sex couples.8 The European
Court of Human Rights, for example, has interpreted the European
Convention on Human Rights to require contracting nations to recognize
family rights of same-sex couples.85 The Court relied on Article 14, which
provides that the rights set forth in the Convention are to be secured
"without discrimination on any ground" to allow the surviving member of a
gay couple to remain in his flat. 6  Under the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam,
similarly, the European Council passed Council Directive 2000/78/EC,
which prohibits "any direct or indirect discrimination based on . . . sexual
83. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2005 (1) SA 19 (CC) at 37 (S. Aft.), available at
http://www.saflii.org/zalcases/ZACC/2005/19.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) (finding a right to same-
sex marriage in the South African Constitution). See also Goodridge v. Dep't. of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (finding a right to same-sex marriage in the Massachusetts' constitution's right
to equality). For a thoughtful comparison of Goodridge and Fourie, see Lisa Newstrom, The Horizon of
Rights: Lessons from South Africa for the Post-Goodridge Analysis of Same-Sex Marriage, 40
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 781, 803 (2007). For a discussion of developments in the United States, see Anita
Bernstein, Subverting the Marriage-Amendment Crusade with Law and Policy Reform, 24 WASH. U. J.
L. & POL'Y 79, 83 (2007) (finding a right to same-sex marriage in the Massachusetts' constitution's
right to equality). For a survey, see Harvard Law Review Assoc., Developments in the Law-The Law
ofMarriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2087-2091 (2003).
84. Katharina Boel-Woelki, The Legal recognition of Same-Sex Relationships within the
European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1949, 1951 (2008).
85. See, e.g., Karner v. Austria, App. No. 40016/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 (2003) (while
welcoming measures taken by the State party to eliminate gender segregation in the labor market,
including through training programs in the area of equal opportunities, the Committee is concerned
about the persistence of traditional stereotypes regarding the roles and tasks of women and men in the
family and in society at large . . . [and] recommends that policies be developed and programs
implemented to ensure the eradication of traditional sex role stereotypes in the family, labor market, the
health sector, academia, politics and society at large).
86. Id. at 29 (the Karner Court also cited Article 8, which guarantees each individual "the
right to respect for his private and family life.").
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orientation." 87  In 2008, the European Court of Justice relied on this
Directive to hold that the surviving partner of a German same-sex partner
might be able to claim a pension. The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered
into force on December 1, 2009, assures the right to marriage without any
language limiting such right to "men and women" and expressly prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.90
Same-sex couples in other regions have also drawn on human rights
law to challenge discrimination. In South America, for example, same sex-
couples have sought assistance from the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. In the case of Marta Lucia Alvarez Giraldo, the
Commission reviewed a complaint brought by the applicant against
Colombia, alleging that the director of the prison in which the applicant was
incarcerated had refused her request for intimate visits from her female life
partner on the basis of her sexual orientation.9' Finding that Colombian law
afforded prisoners a right to intimate visits, the Commission determined
that the applicant had stated a colorable claim of arbitrary and abusive
interference with her private life, in violation of Article 11(2) of the
American Convention on Human Rights.92
On June 3, 2008, the General Assembly of the Organization of
American States (OAS), with the support of thirty-four OAS member
countries, adopted the Resolution on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation,
and Gender Identity. 93 The resolution takes note of the importance of the
adoption of the Yogyakarta Principles and affirms the core principles of
non-discrimination and universality in international law.94 States also
agreed to hold a special meeting "to discuss the application of the principles
87. Council Directive 2000/78, art. 16, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 12 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:303:0016:0022:en:PDF (last visited Mar. 13,
2012) (establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation).
88. Case C-267/06, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstal Der Deutschen Buhnen, 2008 E.C.R. 1-
1757.
89. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, O.J. (C 306) 1 (the Treaty of Lisbon is also called the "Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union.").
90. Id. art. 1.3; Elizabeth F. Defeis, The Treaty ofLisbon and Human Rights, 16 ILSA J. INT'L
& CoMp. L. 413, 419 (2010).
91. Giraldo v. Colombia, Case 11,656, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 71/99,
OEA/Ser.L1V/II.106 Doc. 3 rev., at 211 (1999) (Colom.).
92. Id. (following unsuccessful attempts to resolve the matter by friendly settlement, the
Commission declared the case admissible, and agreed to publish the decision, to continue analyzing the
merits of the case, and to renew its efforts to conclude a friendly settlement).
93. Rex Wockner, Norway Legalizes Marriage, BAY TIMES, June 19, 2008,
http://www.sfbaytimes.com/index.php?sec=article&articleId=8382 (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
94. Id.
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and norms of the Inter-American system on abuses based on sexual
orientation and gender identity."9
In North America, Canada passed the Civil Marriage Act in 2005,
which recognizes same-sex marriage.96  In the United States, six states
currently allow same-sex marriage.9 Forty-three states have laws explicitly
prohibiting such marriages, including twenty-nine with constitutional
amendments restricting marriage to one man and one woman. In Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, Judge Vaughn Walker relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down California's Proposition 8, which barred same-
sex marriage.99 In doing so, Judge Walker raised the question of same-sex
marriage in the United States to the constitutional level for the first time."'0
On the international level, too, the trend is clearly toward the
recognition of rights for same-sex couples. In Toonen v. Australia, for
example, the Human Rights Committee determined that the provisions of
the Tasmanian Criminal Code, which criminalized private same-gender
sexual conduct between consenting adults, constituted an arbitrary
interference with the author's privacy, in violation of Article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.o'0 Nor could the
provisions be upheld for the purpose of preventing the spread of AIDS.'o2
The Committee also held, however, that the rights of same-sex couples to
95. Id.
96. Civil Marriage Act, 2005, SC, c.33 (Can.); see generally Peter Bowal & Carlee Campbell,
The Legalization ofSame-Sex Marriage in Canada, 21 AM. J. FAM. L. 37 (2007).
97. They are: Massachusetts, see Goodridge, supra note 83; Connecticut, see Kerrigan v.
Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Iowa, see Vamrn v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862
(Iowa 2009); Vermont, see VT. STAT. ANN. CIVIL MARRIAGE TIT. 15 § 8 (West 2009); New Hampshire,
see N.H. REV. STATE. ANN. § 45:1 (2010); and New York, see N.Y. DOM. REL. Law § 10(a) (McKinney
2011). See generally Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict ofLaws Analysis,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 2195 (2005). See J. Thomas Oldham, Developments in the US-The Struggle over the
Creation of a Status for Same-Sex Partners, in THE INT'L SURVEY OF FAMILY LAw 485 (Andrew
Bainham ed., 2006).
98. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 65, at 234. See also Maria Godoy, State by State: The Legal
Battle Over Gay Marriage, NAT'L PUBLIC RADIO (Feb. 7, 2012, 11:37 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2009/12/15/112448663/state-by-state-the-legal-battle-over-gay-marriage (last
visited Mar. 18, 2012).
99. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (2010).
100. Editorial, Marriage is a Constitutional Right, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at A26. On
February 23, 2011, the Obama Administration advised the Speaker of the House that it would no longer
defend the constitutionality of Sec. 3 of DOMA. Marc Ambinder, Obama Won't Go to Court Over
Defense of Marraige Act, NAT'L J. (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.nationaljoumal.com/obama-won-t-go-
to-court-over-defense-of-marriage-act-20110223 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
101. Toonen v. Australia, [1994] 6.1 Conm'n No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Austl.), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws488.htm
(last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
102. Id. at 6.5.
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marry cannot be grounded in the Civil Covenant because of its specific
language.103
In part because of such limitations in existing human rights law,'" in
2006, the International Commission of Jurists and the International Service
for Human Rights, on behalf of a coalition of human rights organizations,
convened a meeting in Indonesia to develop a set of international principles
regarding sexual orientation and gender identity. Twenty-nine
distinguished experts in human rights law from twenty-five countries
unanimously adopted the Yogyakarta Principles, 05  which they agreed
reflect the existing state of international human rights law in relation to
issues of "sexual orientation and gender identity."' 06  As set out in the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, the views of such experts may
be relied upon in determining rules of law. 0 7 The Yogyakarta Principles,
rigorously supported by sixty-six pages of jurisprudential annotations,'0 8
affirm a broad range of rights, including "the core human rights principles
of equality, universality and non-discrimination . . . it is unthinkable to
exclude persons from these protections because of their . . . sexual
103. As the Committee explained in Joslin v. New Zealand:
Article 23, paragraph 2 of the Covenant is the only substantive provision . . .
which defines a right by using the term "men and women," rather than "every
human being," "everyone" and "all persons." Use of the term "men and women,"
rather than the general terms used elsewhere in Part III of the Covenant, has been
consistently and uniformly understood as indicating that the treaty obligation of
States parties stemming from article 23, paragraph 2, of the Covenant is to
recognize as marriage only the union between a man and woman. ...
Joslin v. New Zealand, [2002] Comm'n No. 902/1999 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 (N.Z.),
available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsfl(Symbol)/e44ccf85efcl669acl256c37002b96c9?Opendocument (last
visited Mar. 18, 2012) (upholding New Zealand's refusal to permit same-gender couples to marry);
Quilter v. Attorney-General, [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (N.Z.). For a provocative discussion, see generally
Vincent J. Samar, Throwing Down the International Gauntlet: Same-Sex Marriage as a Human Right,
6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 1 (2007).
104. Michael O'Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International
Human Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Priciples, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 232 (2008)
(noting that "[t]he High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, has expressed concern about
the inconsistency of approach in law and practice . . . [regarding] . . . sexual orientation and gender
identity.").
105. Id. at 233.
106. Id. at 247.
107. Int'l Court of Justice, Statute of the International Court ofJustice, art. 38, http://www. icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_11 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) ("The
court ... shall apply ... the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.").
108. Michael O'Flaherty, Annotation, Jurisprudential Annotations to the Yogyakarta Principles,
8 UNIV. OF NOTrINGHAM HUM. RTS. LAW CTR 1 (2007), available at
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/yogyakarta-principles-jurisprudential-annotations.pdf (last visited
Mar. 13, 2012).
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orientation or gender identity."'" The Principles also set out concrete
measures states must take to assure these rights."o
On December 12, 2008, sixty-six nations at the U.N. General
Assembly supported a groundbreaking Statement confirming that
international human rights protections apply to sexual orientation and
gender identity."' The Statement was read by Argentina, and a
Counterstatement, signed by fifty-nine states, was read by the Syrian Arab
Republic.1 2 The states opposing human rights for same-sex couples do not
seek to ground their arguments in international law, however. Rather, they
claim that the Statement endorsing these rights "lack[ed] . . . legal grounds
[and] delves into matters which fall essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of States."' '3 This is belied by the exhaustive research
supporting the Yogyakarta Principles.' 14 While there is no state consensus
on the issue, there is a clear trend toward recognizing the rights of same-sex
couples. Thus, although homosexuality remains a crime in seventy-six
countries and is still punishable by death in five, a growing body of
international equality jurisprudence increasingly supports these rights."'
109. Michael O'Flaherty & John Fisher, supra note 104, at 241.
110. Id.
Ill. U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 70th plen. mtg. at 30, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.70 (Dec. 18,2008).
112. Id. The Counterstatement, signed by 59 states, condemned the Statement, arguing further
that:
More important, it depends on the ominous usage of two notions. The notion of
orientation spans a wide range of personal choices that expand far beyond the
individual sexual interest in a copulatory behavior between normal consenting
adult human beings, thereby ushering in the social normalization and possibly the
legitimization of many deplorable acts, including pedophilia. The second notion
is often suggested to attribute particular sexual interests or behaviours to genetic
factors, a matter that has repeatedly been scientifically rebuffed.
Id. at 31.
113. Id.; see also O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 104, at 238-43 (describing the "Reaction by
States and other Actors within United Nations Fora.").
114. See O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 104, at 238.
115. DANIEL OTTOSSON, INT'L LESBIAN & GAY Assoc., STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA, A
WORLD SURVEY OF LAWS PROHIBITING SAME SEX ACTIVITY BETWEEN CONSENTING ADULTS 4, 45
(2011), available at http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGAStateSponsoredHomophobia
2011 .pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) (This jurisprudence includes the recent decision of the High Court
of Delhi, which ruled in 2009 that section 377 of the Indian Penal Code could not be applied to sexual
activities between consenting adults. The ruling affects all of India, except Jammu and Kashmir, where
a different penal code applies, and affects approximately one sixth of the human population); Anjuli W.
McReynolds, What International Experience Can Tell U.S. Courts About Same-Sex Marriage, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1073, 1076 (2006) (the absence of consensus only matters in ascertaining customary
international law, which is not in issue. It could be argued, however, that there is regional customary
international law with respect to same-sex relationships in Europe).
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C. The Child's Rights
Surrogacy implicates several rights of the child under the CRC. First,
the child's rights are to be "respect[ed] and ensure[d] . . . without
discrimination of any kind . .. [including] birth or other status."' 16 While
this provision was originally intended to protect illegitimate children, its
inclusiveness suggests a generous and expansive application, including
children born of surrogacyl 7 .
Article 7 is the most problematic here. Article 7.1 provides in
pertinent part that "the child shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality,
and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents."' There are two difficulties with this provision, both grounded in
its presumptive incorporation of national law. If that law provides that a
mother is the person giving birth, the child's status is unclear. If that law
provides that a child born of surrogacy cannot acquire the nationality of her
intending parties, similarly, the child may be in a precarious situation.
Either problem can be rectified by reforming domestic law or as proposed
in the pending Indian legislation on surrogacy, by requiring the intending
parents to prove, before entering into a surrogacy arrangement, that the
resulting child will be granted citizenship in the state where her intending
parents live, and that they, in fact, will be legally recognized as her parents
in that state."1 '
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has described transnational surrogacy and indicated a few
of the many issues the subject raises under international human rights law.
It has not addressed many other troublesome issues, including donor
anonymity, the right of the child to "social," as opposed to "biological,"
information, and issues of exploitation, especially when what is
contemplated is not rare, altruistic surrogacy, but a $400 to $500 million per
year business.120
116. CRC, supra note 26, art. 2(1).
117. CRC, supra note 26, art. 1.
118. CRC, supra note 26, art. 7(1).
119. Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children: Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REv. 1177, 1228 (2010).
120. Hague Conf. on Private Int'l Law, supra note 9, at 6; Krawiec, supra note 11, at 225.
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